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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Derek Moad appeals, challenging the guilty verdicts entered against him for male
rape, battery with intent to commit rape or the infamous crime against nature, and
misdemeanor battery. He contends that the convictions for rape and battery with intent
to commit rape violated his unwaived double jeopardy rights, as they both addressed
one continuing course of conduct. He also contends that the double jeopardy violation
is clear from the face of the record, in part, because the jury instructions that were given
allowed for the double jeopardy violation.

He also contends there was insufficient

evidence to support the guilty verdict for battery with intent to commit rape.
The State responds, arguing that the two events were sufficiently distinguishable
to not violate the double jeopardy clause. However, since the evidence, including the
alleged victim's own testimony, shows that the acts were not temporally or
circumstantially separate, they were part of the same course of criminal conduct. As
such, the dual punishment for the same course of criminal conduct violates the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy.
The State also contends that Mr. Moad's arguments regarding the jury
instructions are precluded by the invited error doctrine, and based on its analysis under
that principle, it is more likely that the jury did not convict on the erroneous theory. That
argument should be rejected be rejected because Mr. Moad is not challenging the
propriety of the given instructions, and thus, such arguments are irrelevant to the issues
raised on appeal. Even if they were, the State's argument should be rejected since the
United States Supreme Court, the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Idaho Court of
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Appeals have all determined that it is improper to try to divine what happened during the
jury's deliberations. Instead, the only question is whether there was the possibility that
the verdict was based on an illegal or unconstitutional ground. If so, it demonstrates the
error, which in this case, is a violation of Mr. Moad's double jeopardy rights. Even if the
likely nature of the jury's deliberations were considered, the fact that there was no
evidence presented to support the allegations made in Count II (there was no evidence
presented of punching, kicking, or the like after the oral rape) means it is more likely that
the jury rested its verdict on the improper theory, thereby violating the double jeopardy
protections.
Finally, if the conviction for battery with intent to commit rape is only considered
to address the actions following the oral rape, there was insufficient evidence to prove
that Mr. Moad had the requisite intent, since he did not try to rape L.T.

The State

suggests various reasons that Mr. Moad may not have done so, but none are supported
by the record.

Since the State bears the burden of proving guilt, and since no

reasonable mind could find beyond a reasonable doubt on the evidence in the record
that Mr. Moad had the requisite intent, that conviction should be vacated.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Moad's Appellant's Brief. With one exception, they need not be repeated in this
Reply Brief.
As the State indicates, Mr. Moad did file an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter,
Rule 35) motion in this case. (See Resp. Br., p.6 n.2.) The order denying that motion
was augmented to the appellate record by the Idaho Supreme Court when it received

2

Mr.

Moad's amended

notice of appeal.

(Order Augmenting

Record,

dated

December 24, 2012.) In order denying Mr. Moad's Rule 35 motion, the district court
indicated that the motion was a request for leniency.

(Order Denying Motion for

Reconsideration Under I.C.R. 35, filed December 18, 2012.)

Mr. Moad did not

challenge that denial on appeal. 1

1 Given that the order denying the Rule 35 motion is already in the record, it is clear that
the Rule 35 motion did not impact the arguments made in this case. However, since the
State implies that the Rule 35 motion may have had some bearing on the issues raised
on appeal (Resp. Sr., p.6 n.2), Mr. Moad has filed a motion to augment the record with
the Rule 35 motion and the parties' briefs on that motion, which make it eminently clear
that the Rule 35 motion does not impact the arguments made in this case.
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ISSUES

1.

Whether the punishment for both Counts I and " violated Mr. Moad's double
jeopardy rights.

2.

Whether there was insufficient evidence to support the guilty verdict against
Mr. Moad for battery with the intent to commit rape or the infamous crime against
nature.

4

ARGUMENT
I.
The Punishments For Both Counts I And" Violated Mr. Moad's Double Jeopardy Rights

A.

Introduction
Mr. Moad contends that the convictions against him violated his double jeopardy

rights since they constitute two convictions for the same course of criminal conduct. He
argues that this violation constitutes fundamental error.
To help demonstrate that the double jeopardy violation is clear on the face of the
record, in his Appe/lant's Brief he pointed to the fact that there was only one course of
criminal conduct and the fact that the jury instructions allowed for the possibility that he
was convicted for battery with intent to commit rape based on the same set of facts that
also served as an element in the rape charge.
The State claims that a double jeopardy claim has to be raised in a Rule 35(a)
motion alleging an i/legal sentence and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal as
fundamental error, and that the alleged events underlying Counts I and II were
sufficiently separated as to not constitute the same criminal conduct.

The State's

argument is contrary to several Court of Appeals' opinions, which expressly allow for
double jeopardy claims to be raised as fundamental error.

Additionally, the State's

claims on the merits of the fundamental error claim - Counts I and " allege sufficiently
separate criminal acts, and so do not violate Mr. Moad's double jeopardy rights - should
also be rejected. Precedent requires there to be some significant temporal, spatial, or
circumstantial separation between the two acts, and the evidence, including the
testimony of the alleged victim, demonstrates that no such separation existed.

5

The State also contends that Mr. Moad cannot rely on the jury instructions since
the propriety of the instructions themselves cannot be challenged under the invited error
doctrine or the fundamental error doctrine. Since Mr. Moad is not arguing that there
was error in the instructions, but only pointing out that the instructions, as given, show
the double jeopardy violation, the State's argument in this regard is wholly irrelevant to
the question presented on appeal. Additionally, the State's argument is flawed on its
merits, since Idaho Supreme Court precedent holds that failing to object to the proposed
jury instructions does not lead to invited error in regard to those instructions. In such
cases, the defense has not "invited" any error, since it did not encourage the district
court to give the instructions. In this case, defense counsel certainly did not encourage
the court to give the instructions at issue, since he expressed concern over the propriety
of the instructions. Therefore, the State's arguments on invited error should be rejected.

B.

A Double Jeopardy Claim May Be Asserted For The First Time On Appeal, As
Double Jeopardy Violations Constitute Fundamental Error
Since the Idaho Supreme Court clarified proper fundamental error review in

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010), the Idaho Court of Appeals has addressed
whether double jeopardy claims may be raised as fundamental error.

See, e.g.,

State v. Day, 154 Idaho 476, 479-82 (Ct. App. 2013) (considering the merits of the
defendant's claim of a fatal variance, and thus, double jeopardy, as fundamental error,
and vacating the conviction for the violation found in that regard), rev. denied;

State v. Corbus. 151 Idaho 368, 370-76 (Ct. App. 2011) (finding that the defendant
failed to show fundamental error for double jeopardy under both the Idaho and United
States constitutions). rev. denied.

In fact, it has explicitly held that "[r]eview of these
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claims [of double jeopardy] would be proper upon a determination of fundamental error."
State v. Ayala, 129 Idaho 911, 919 (Ct. App. 1996); see also State v. Swader, 137
Idaho 733, 736 (Ct. App. 2002) (reaffirming that "review [of the defendant's double
jeopardy argument] is proper upon a determination of fundamental error."); State v.
Hussain, 143 Idaho 175, 176-77 (Ct. App. 2006) (same).
Nevertheless, the State contends that Mr. Moad was required to raise this issue
in a motion alleging an illegal sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35(a). (Resp. Br., ppA-7.)
Ignoring the Court of Appeals' decisions directly addressing the question of whether
double jeopardy claims are properly addressed under fundamental error, the State
relies on four other cases which do not discuss double jeopardy, but rather, focus on
other challenges to the legality of the sentences.

(Resp. Br., pp.6-7 (citing

State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842 (1991), State v. Martin, 119 Idaho 577 (1990), State v.
Dorsey, 126 Idaho 659 (Ct. App. 1995), and State v. Hernandez, 122 Idaho 227
(Ct. App. 1992).)

In Lavy, the Idaho Supreme Court declined to address the

defendant's claim that the imposed sentence exceeded the sentence authorized by the
statute for the first time on appeal. Lavy, 121 Idaho at 845. The Court of Appeals
recognized a similar situation existed in Hernandez, but neither party had actually raised
the issue. Hernandez, 122 Idaho at 229. In Martin, the Idaho Supreme Court refused
to consider the State's argument regarding the legality of terms imposed pursuant to
withheld judgment for the first time on appeal. Martin, 119 Idaho at 578-79. In Dorsey,
the Court of Appeals refused to consider the defendant's untimely challenge to the
legality of a restitution award for the first time on appeal. Dorsey, 126 Idaho at 662.
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None of those cases dealt with the alleged violation of a constitutional right. See
generally Lavy, 121 Idaho at 843-44 (illegal sentence claim addressed in Section I);
Martin, 118 Idaho at 578-79 (illegal sentence claim addressed in Section II); Dorsey,

126 Idaho at 661-62 (illegal sentence claim addressed in Section II); Hernandez, 122
Idaho at 229 (pointing out the existence of the issue before addressing the parties'
claims).

Since a violation of the constitutional protections against double jeopardy

would go to the foundation of defendant's rights, Perry, 150 Idaho at 226-27 (discussing
the definition and scope of the fundamental error rule), the rationales in cases cited by
the State are inapplicable to this case.
Where there is case law directly on point which provides that the merits of the
claim Mr. Moad is raising may be properly addressed for the first time on appeal, the
State's argument to the contrary fails.

C.

The Prejudicial Violation Of Mr. Moad's Unwaived Double Jeopardy Rights Is
Clear From The Face Of The Record
Two different aspects of the record show the clear violation of Mr. Moad's double

jeopardy rights. First, the record shows that the actions alleged in Counts I and " were
part of the same course of criminal conduct, and therefore, the multiple punishments for
that criminal conduct violated Mr. Moad's right to be free from double jeopardy.
Second, the jury instructions leave open the possibility that the jury found Mr. Moad
guilty on Count" based on actions that also were included as an element of Count I.
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1.

The Record Shows A Clear Violation Of Mr. Moad's Constitutional Rights
Because Counts I and" Address A Single Course Of Criminal Conduct

The State concedes that battery with intent to commit rape is a lesser included
offense of rape. (Resp. Br., p.9.) Therefore, if Mr. Moad's actions constitute a single
course of criminal conduct, then he has demonstrated the clear violation of his double
jeopardy rights. On that point, the State contends that there was sufficient separation
between the event at the door and the event on the bunk to make them separate
courses of conduct. (Resp. Br., pp.7-11.) That argument ignores the evidence in this
case, and the testimony of the alleged victim in particular. Notably, L.T. testified that the
event near the door happened "in the same period of time as [the event on the bunk]
had happened." (Tr., Vo1.2, p.157, L.22 - p.158, L.2.) L.T. also testified that the event
at the bunk was "at the same altercation" as the event at the door. (Tr., Vo1.2, p.158,
LA.) Therefore, the uncontradicted facts in the record are that both events were part of
the same altercation occurring at the same time. (Tr., Vo1.2, p.157, L.22 - p.158, L.4.)
The State attempts to parse the two events apart into separate criminal acts: "there
was no double jeopardy violation because [Mr.] Moad's oral rape of L.T. near the prison
cell door was a separate and distinct act from his subsequent sexual battery of L.T. that
took place on the cell bunk.,,2 (Resp. Br., p.9.) In so doing, the State is trying to divide
a single crime up based on the spatial position of the acts in the cell. (Resp. Br., p.9.)

As a matter of clarity, Mr. Moad has not been charged with "sexual battery," which
requires very specific types of contact with a minor person's genitals. I.C. § 18-1508A.
Mr. Moad was only charged in Count" with battery with intent to commit rape pursuant
to I.C. §§ 18-903 and -911. (R., p.12.) None of the alleged conduct constituting the
battery was sexual, as he was accused of "punching, elbowing, kneeing, and/or kicking
[L.T.] multiple times." (R., p.13.) Nor was it alleged that L.T. was a minor. (See
R., p.13.)
2

9

This is exactly the sort of analysis that the Untitled States Supreme Court has expressly
rejected: "The Double Jeopardy Clause is not such a fragile guarantee that prosecutors
can avoid its limitations by the simple expedient of dividing a single crime into a series
of temporal or spatial units." Brown v. United States, 432 U.S. 161, 167 (1977).
Pursuant to this principle, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that multiple
prosecutions are impermissible when the acts in question "were not separate acts at
different

times,

in

different

places,

with

different

actors

or

circumstances."

State v. Estes, 111 Idaho 423, 427 (1986). Thus, the impact of the rule from Brown is

clear: unless there is significant temporal, spatial, or circumstantial separation between
the acts, breaking the criminal conduct into multiple offenses violates the protections
against double jeopardy. See Brown, 432 U.S. at 167; Estes, 111 Idaho at 427.
Thus, in Estes, while there may have been separate penetrations, they were not
spatially, temporally, or circumstantially distinct, and so the district court had properly
instructed on only one count of criminal conduct. Estes, 111 Idaho at 427. Similarly, in
State v. Moffat, the Court of Appeals determined there was no significant spatial or

temporal separation between that the alleged acts of domestic battery and attempted
strangulation, and thus, the dual prosecution violated the protections against double
jeopardy. Moffat, 154 Idaho 529, 533-34 (Ct. App. 2013), rev. denied. On the other
hand, in State v. Grin 0 Ids , there was a notable temporal separation between the two
acts of rape alleged when the defendant left the room, sufficiently distinguishing the two
alleged acts for double jeopardy purposes. Grinolds, 121 Idaho 673, 675 (1992). In
that same vein, the Court of Appeals noted that charges for the same conduct against
the same victim were temporally and spatially distinct, given they occurred in different
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places on different days, could be charged as separate criminal acts, even though both
counts alleged the same time frame. State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 41,48 (Ct. App. 2003).
In this case, the State relies on State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 33-34 (1997),
focusing on the fact that two separate criminal acts of sexual assault in Bush occurred
in the same room in relatively close temporal proximity.

(Resp. Br., pp.10-11.) The

facts in that case indicate spatial, temporal, and circumstantial differences.

See id.

There was the spatial distance between the bed and the couch. Id. at 34. There was
also the circumstantial and temporal difference because "other events occurred

between these acts of sexual assault." Id. (emphasis added). Critically, the only two
acts at issue were charged as "lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen" and "an
infamous crime against nature." Id. at 26 (identifying them as counts II and III of the
information, and noting that "Bush filed a motion to dismiss claiming that counts II and '"
involving J.S. were a continuous course of the same act").

Thus, the other acts

occurring in between the two charged acts (which, incidentally, was a battery which was

not separately charged) separated the two sexual acts into two courses of criminal
conduct. See id.
The State's attempted distinction is artificial.

While the evidence in this case

does show a similar, minimal amount of spatial separation,3 it does not show "other
events" occurring between the two alleged acts, and thus, no temporal separation. In
fact, L.T.'s testimony clearly indicates that there were no events between the two

3 State's Exhibits 1a-1f
State's Exhibits 1a-1f;
describing the cells with
"separation" in this case

show just how little space there was in the prison cell. (See
Tr., Vo1.2, p.107, L.20-p.112, L.9 (Officer Jenny Cheney
the aid of Exhibits 1a-1f).) Those pictures show that the spatial
was a matter offeet. (See State's Exhibit 1a-1f.)
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alleged acts. (Tr., Vo1.2, p.157, L.22 - p.158, L.4.) The acts in Count I (using his penis
to penetrate the oral opening of L.T.) ended when the penetration did. (R., pp.12-13.)
The criminal conduct in Count II was not limited to only one subsequent, purportedlysexual act; it addressed the next series of actions Mr. Moad allegedly made: "punching,
elbowing, kneeing, and/or kicking [L.T.]"4 (R., p.13.) According to L.T., those acts were
all "at the same altercation," all happening "in the same period of time." (Tr., Vo1.2,
p.158, L.4; Tr., Vo1.2, p.157, L.22 - p.158, L.2; see also Tr., Vo1.2. p.124. Ls.9-12.)
Therefore, based on the evidence in the record, there were no other events between the
acts alleged in Count I and the acts alleged in Count II. As such, there was no temporal
distinction. Thus, the State's reliance on Bush is misplaced; this case is more akin to
Estes and Moffat.
The third factor of separation, circumstantial separation, is, perhaps, the most
important of the three factors of separation, and that which most clearly demonstrates
the error in the State's argument. In Brown, the United States Supreme Court held that,

4 The only evidence specifically referring to punching, kicking, kneeing, and the like
established that such conduct happened before the oral rape and in regard to Count III.
(See Tr., Vo1.2, p.162, L.13 - p.163, L.11 (L.T. testifying about such conduct at the same
time as Mr. Moad allegedly hit him in the face with his penis (which occurred on
June 10, 2011»; State's Exhibit 2 (Mr. Moad's written statement, which does not
mention anything that day after the oral rape); Tr., Vo1.2, p.185, L.14 - p.187, L.22
(Officer 8uie testifying about Mr. Moad's admissions, noting specifically that he did not
ask Mr. Moad about the events after the oral rape).) Regardless, the only suggestion of
behavior like that was from Officer Cheney: "And after that portion was done,
[Mr. Moad] subsequently smacked [L.T.] around a little bit more. Somewhere along the
way, they ended up where [L.T.] was face down on the bottom bunk." (Tr., Vo1.2, p.124.
Ls.9-12.) As such, the only evidence in regard to the sequence of events following the
oral rape is L.T.'s testimony that everything was part of the same altercation, occurring
without any temporal break. (Tr., Vo1.2, p.158, L.4; Tr., Vo1.2, p.157, L.22 - p.158, L.2;
Tr., Vo1.2, p.124, Ls.9-12.) The additional impacts of this lack of evidence will be
discussed in detail in Sections 1(8)(2) and II, supra.
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based on the applicable law, two acts which occurred nine days apart in two different
counties, were not sufficiently distinct for double jeopardy purposes because they were

not circumstantially distinct - they were both part of a single, continuing criminal impulse
or intent. Brown, 432 Idaho at 169.

Specifically, it held, "the specification of different

dates in the two charges on which Brown was convicted cannot alter the fact that he
was placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense .... " Id. at 169-70. The Idaho
Supreme Court has reached a similar conclusion in a case addressing whether there
occurred a single charge of possession of stolen property or multiple charges when
multiple items were being possessed. State v. Major, 111 Idaho 410,414 (1986). As in
Brown, the temporal and spatial distinctions drawn by law enforcement were of little

consequence. See id. Even though the alleged acts were occurring in several different
jurisdictions over the course of several hours, there was but one criminal offense

because all the acts were taken "as part of 'a single incident or pursuant to a common
scheme or plan reflecting a single, continuing [criminal] impulse or intent.'" Major, 111
Idaho at 414 (quoting State v. Lloyd, 103 Idaho 382, 383 (1982)).

Contrarily, in Bush,

there was some evidence suggesting a change in the criminal impulse (the victim's
resistance, which led the defendant to tie up the victim). See Bush 131 Idaho at 34.
However, in this case, there is no such evidence suggesting any change in the
intent or impulse driving the altercation.

Compare Bush, 131 Idaho at 34; see also

Grin olds , 121 Idaho at 675. All the evidence indicates that Mr. Moad's actions were

driven by his frustration with L.T., specifically, L.T.'s disrespect of Mr. Moad. (See, e.g.,
State's Exhibit 4 (recorded interview with Mr. Moad, stating this as the reason for his
behavior); Tr., Vo1.2, p.123, LS.9-10 (Officer Ibarra testifying that was Mr. Moad's
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statement to Officer Buie in regard to this incident); Tr., Vo1.2, p.185, LS.3-11 (Officer
Buie testifying to the same); Tr., Vo1.2, p.155, Ls.1-3 (L.T. testifying about why the
incident occurred).) Since that was the only impulse testified to by any of the witnesses,
the evidence demonstrates there was no change in impulse or intent in regard to
Mr. Moad's actions at that time. As such, the State's reliance on Bush is misplaced.
This case is more alike to Brown and Major, since there was no circumstantial
distinction. Therefore, there was but one course of criminal conduct.
The result is that, contrary to the State's assertions, the violation of Mr. Moad's
unwaived constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy is clear from the record:
the convictions for Counts I and II were for the same course of criminal conduct. The
prejudice of that violation is self-evident:

Mr. Moad is serving two sentences for the

same criminal act. (See R., p.137.) Therefore, Mr. Moad has shown fundamental error
in this regard. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 227.

2.

The JUry Instructions Also Show The Clear Violation Of Mr. Moad's
Double Jeopardy Rights And The Doctrine Of Invited Error Is Inapplicable
In This Regard

The violation of Mr. Moad's double jeopardy rights is even more apparent from
the jury instructions. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. The jury instructions left open the
possibility for the jury to convict Mr. Moad of battery with intent to commit rape for his
pre-rape actions. Such a conviction would obviously violate double jeopardy because
the pre-rape actions had to serve as the "overcoming will by force or threat" element of
the rape charge. (See, e.g., R., pp.12-13.)
The State claims that Mr. Moad cannot rely on the scope of the jury instructions
in this case because, it claims, defense counsel invited any instructional error that may
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have occurred.

It is wrong for two reasons:

first, the argument is irrelevant to the

argument Mr. Moad is making, since he is not raising an issue of instructional error; and
second, acquiescence to the court's proposed jury instructions does not constitute
invited error.
First, the concept of invited error in the instructions is not relevant to the issue
raised in this appeal. Mr. Moad is asserting that his constitutional right to be free from
double jeopardy was violated and that the instructions make that error clear in the
record. He is not asserting an independent claim of instructional error. As such, even if
Mr. Moad could have (or even should have) raised the separate instructional error
claim, all the State's arguments about whether the instructions were themselves
appropriate are misplaced in this appeal.
Even if the State's arguments are appropriate, defense counsel did not invite any
error in regard to the jury instructions. Where the defendant has not expressed his
concurrence with the proposed instructions and he did not request the proposed

instruction, he is not precluded from raising a challenge to the propriety of those
instructions on appeal. State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 447 (2012). The doctrine of
invited error does not apply where the defendant "did not encourage the district court to
offer the specific ... instruction given, but merely failed to object."

Id. (emphasis

added); see also State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240 (1999) ("Slake's counsel's
concurrence [with the proposed instructions] did not invite the court to give the
challenged instruction; the judge had already made that decision.") Mr. Moad is in the
same situation as the defendants in Adamcik and Blake because, as the State notes
(Resp. Sr., p.14), defense counsel actually expressed concern with the proposed
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instruction. All defense counsel did was ask the district court for a decision on how it
wanted to address that concern:

I don't know if this is better in argument to the jury or in jury instruction,
just reading how the case is charged, I think Counts I and " can be
somewhat confusing .... [s]o I don't know if that's just better explained in
argument to the jury or if a jury instruction explaining that they are
separate and distinct would be appropriate.
(Tr., Vo1.2, p.203, LS.9-12 (emphasis added).) Defense counsel did not encourage one
course of action over the other, and as such, was not inviting any error in the proposed
instructions. Compare Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 447; Blake, 133 Idaho at 240. Rather,
defense counsel pointed out a problem in the instructions and asked the district court to
make a ruling as to how it was going to deal with that problem. (See Tr., Vo1.2, p.203,
Ls.9-12.)

Even if this does not constitute a full-fledged objection to the proposed

instructions, merely failing to object to the proposed instruction does not invite an error
that exists in those instructions. See id. Therefore, the State's arguments regarding the
invited error doctrine should be rejected.
Rather, the jury instructions, as they exist, demonstrate that the convictions on
Counts I and II violated Mr. Moad's double jeopardy rights because they allowed the
jury to convict him for battery with intent to commit rape based on the same pre-rape
actions that were part of the rape charge. Count I, as charged, required the State to
show that L.T. was prevented from resisting by threats of great bodily harm with the
apparent ability to do so, "to-wit: by physically beating and choking [L.T.]." (R., pp.12-13
(emphasis added).) Therefore, the kicking, punching, and kneeing which took place
before the rape necessarily was included in the rape charge.

As such, separately

convicting him for battery for those same actions violates double jeopardy. See, e.g.,
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United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129 (1980); State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho
619,622 (Ct. App. 2001).
The State contends that the party relying on the jury instructions in this manner
needs to show affirmatively that the jury decided on the improper grounds.

(Resp.

Br., p.15 ("While the jury instruction and facts adduced at trial created the theoretical
possibility that the jury could have found [Mr.] Moad guilty [on the improper theory],
[Mr.] Moad cannot demonstrate that the jury actually did so in light of the parties' closing
arguments, the jury instructions ... and the evidence presented." (emphasis added).)
That contention ignores the long-standing rule that inquiry into the deliberation process
is improper. See, e.g., I.R.E 606(b); Hall v. State, 151 Idaho 42, 49 (2011) (quoting
Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 124-25 (1987) (quoting U.S. Code & Admin.
News 1974, p.7060»; State v. Moses, _

P.3d _ , 2013 Opinion No.25, p.8 n.3

(Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Hall, 151 Idaho at 51). Requiring the appel/ant to show that the

jury actually found him guilty on the erroneous theory would require an impermissible
inquiry into the deliberation process.
Rather, when reviewing the jury instructions in such cases, the United States
Supreme Court has held, "[i]n these circumstances we think the proper rule to be
applied is that which requires a verdict to be set aside in cases where the verdict is
supportable on one ground, but not on another, and it is impossible to tell which ground
the jury selected. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312 (1957), overruled on other
grounds by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 8 (1978). The Idaho Supreme Court has
also reached that conclusion:

"The jury instruction allows the jury to convict Luke

absent a finding of specific intent. Thus, the jury could have convicted Luke on a basis
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of less than specific intent. . .. In cases where it is not possible to determine if the jury
reached the verdict on the correct or incorrect legal theory, this Court must vacate the
conviction and remand the case for a new trial." State v. Luke, 134 Idaho 294, 301
(2000) (emphasis added). The Idaho Court of Appeals continues to apply that standard:
The two instructions may well have led to jury confusion . . .. The
instructions did not preclude the jury from finding McNair guilty [on an
erroneous theory]. When it is not possible to determine whether the jury
reached its verdict on a correct or incorrect legal theory, an appellate court
must vacate the conviction and remand the case for a new trial.

State v. McNair, 141 Idaho 263, 270 (Ct. App. 2005).

Therefore, if the instructions

allowed for the possibility that Mr. Moad was convicted on the erroneous legal theory,
they demonstrate the error on the face of the record.
Consequently, the State's argument - "it is exceedingly more likely that the jury
analyzed the case the way it was framed by both the parties" (Resp. Br., p.15) - is
wholly improper, as it seeks to probe into the minds and thought processes of the jurors
during deliberations. Since there is the possibility that the jury convicted Mr. Moad in
violation of his double jeopardy rights, the record shows a clear violation of that right.
And even if this Court were to consider the likelihood of the direction of the jury's
deliberations, it is just as likely that, considering the evidence presented, the jury
convicted on the wrong theory. After all, it was instructed with regard to Count 1/ that
the State had to prove:
1. On or between June 3, 2011 and June 8, 2011; 2. in the State of Idaho;
3. the defendant committed a battery upon [L.T.]; 4. by punching,
elbowing, kneeing and/or kicking [L.T.] multiple times, and 5. The
defendant did so with the intent to commit rape and/or the infamous crime
against nature.
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(R., p.110.) As indicated in note 4, supra, there was very little evidence presented that
Mr. Moad had punched, elbowed, kneed, and/or kicked L.T. after the oral rape occurred.

(See Tr., Vo1.2, p.162, L.13 - p.163, L.11 (L.T. testifying about such conduct at the same
time Mr. Moad allegedly hit him in the face with his penis (which occurred on June 10,
2011 »; State's Exhibit 2 (Mr. Moad's written statement, mentioning nothing anything
that day after the oral rape); Tr., Vo1.2, p.185, L.14 - p.187, L.22 (Officer Buie testifying
about Mr. Moad's admissions, noting specifically that he did not ask Mr. Moad about the
events after the oral rape); but see (Tr., Vo1.2, p.124, LS.9-12 (Officer Cheney testifying
the Mr. Moad had "smacked [L.T.] around a little bit more").) There is no requirement
that the jurors accept the issues as framed by the lawyers. In fact, they were instructed
to exactly the opposite effect:
Certain things you have heard or seen are not evidence, including:
1. Arguments and statements by lawyers. The lawyers are not witnesses.
What they say in their opening statements, closing arguments and at other
times is intended to help you interpret the evidence, but is not evidence. If
the facts as you remember them differ from the way the lawyers have
stated them, follow your memory.

(R., p.101 (emphasis added).) Therefore, if properly discussing likelihoods, it is more
likely that the jurors followed this instruction, since the courts presume the jurors follow
the instructions given. See, e.g., State v. Carson, 151 Idaho 713,718 (2011). As such,
it is more likely that the jurors considered the kicking and punching in the context in
which the witnesses testified - that the punching, elbowing, kneeing and/or kicking
occurred before the oral rape or in regard to Count III. (Tr., Vo1.2, p.162, L.13 - p.163,
L.11; State's Exhibit 2; Tr., Vo1.2, p.185, L.14 - p.187, L.22.)
Ultimately, the State conceded that there is a possibility that the jury convicted on
the improper legal theory under the facts presented at trial and the instructions as they
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were given.

(Resp. Br., p.15 ("While the jury instruction and facts adduced at trial

created the theoretical possibility that the jury could have found [Mr.] Moad guilty [on an
improper theory] .... ") As such, it has effectively conceded that there was a clear
violation of Mr. Moad's double jeopardy rights.

Therefore, this Court should vacate

Mr. Moad's conviction for battery with intent to commit rape because of that violation of
his right to be free from double jeopardy.

II.

There Was Insufficient Evidence To Support The Guilt~ Verdict Against Mr. Moad For
Battery With Intent To Commit Rape Or The Infamous Crime Against Nature
If Count 1/ was sufficiently limited to only the post-rape activities, the State failed
to present sufficient evidence to prove that Mr. Moad had the requisite intent to be guilty
of battery with the intent to commit rape. It also failed, as previously discussed, to prove
the battery as it had been charged, since there was insufficient evidence presented at
trial indicating that there was any punching, elbowing, kneeing, and/or kicking that
occurred following the oral rape in the time frame identified by Count II.
The testimony given by L. T. demonstrates that if Mr. Moad had the intent to rape
L.T., he would have done so since, during such confrontations, Mr. Moad was able to do
whatever he intended to do to L.T.

(Tr., Vo1.2, p.155, Ls.14-16.)

activities are very similar to those alleged in Count III.

The post-rape

(See R., p.13; compare

Tr., Vol.2, p.158, LsA-8 (L.T. testifying regarding Count II, that Mr. Moad forced him
onto the bunk, and rubbed his penis on L.T.); with Tr., Vol.2, p.162, L.23 - p.163, L.11
(L.T. testifying regarding Count '", that Mr. Moad hit him with his fists and knees, before
rubbing his penis on L.T.). The jury obviously found the requisite intent missing for the
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nearly-identical conduct in Count III, since it acquitted of the battery with intent to
commit rape and only convicted Mr. Moad on the lesser included offense of
misdemeanor battery. (R., pp.125-26.)
However, the State suggests that the circumstances attendant to Mr. Moad's
post-rape actions are sufficient to show intent.

If the nearly-identical attendant

circumstances in Count III were insufficient to show intent, then they were insufficient to
show intent in Count II. While the State suggests several potential alternative reasons
why Mr. Moad may have stopped his assault on L.T., there is no evidence to support
any of its alternatives. (See generally R., Tr.) Since the State bears the burden to
prove that Mr. Moad had the requisite intent, its proffer of several unsupported potential
explanations should be rejected.
Since no reasonable mind could conclude that this evidence shows beyond a
reasonable doubt that Mr. Moad had the intent to rape when he continued his assault on
Mr. Moad after the oral rape, the State failed to present sufficient evidence.

See

State v. Glass, 139 Idaho 815, 818 (Ct. App. 2003) (stating the standard for appellate
review of the sufficiency of the evidence). Therefore, the conviction on Count II should
be vacated.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Moad respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction for battery
with the intent to commit rape or the infamous crime against nature based on the double
jeopardy violation.

Alternatively, he respectfully requests this Court vacate that

conviction for lack of sufficient evidence. In either case, he respectfully requests this
Court remand his case for further proceedings.
DATED this 16th day of October, 2013.

RIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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